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We present a two-period dynamic model of standard setting under
asymmetric information to model the attempts by the Califormia Air
Resources Board (CARB) in getting car manufacturers to comply with
its phase-in of stringent emissions standards. After CARB chooses an
initial emissions standard that ﬁrms are required to comply with, au-
tomakers respond by choosing R&D investment and production levels
which provide CARB an imperfect signal whether they are more or
less capable of complying with the standard. CARB resets the en-
vironmental standard and the ﬁrms once again choose research and
production levels. Firms are Cournot duopolists in the product mar-
ket and can choose to do research noncooperatively or cooperatively in
the presence of spillovers. We show that ﬁrms will behave strategically
and underinvest in research both under competitive and cooperative
R&D, though the level of underinvestment — the ratchet eﬀect — is
greater under cooperative R&D when spillovers are large. We uncover
a fundamental conﬂict between the incentives of ﬁrms to do cooper-
ative research and social welfare: that ﬁrms will want to engage in
cooperative (resp. noncooperative) R&D only when spillovers are low
(resp. high) while social welfare is greater under noncooperative (resp.
cooperative) research.
JEL Numbers: L5, O3
Keywords: Car emissions, dynamic technology-forcing regulation, self-
regulation, pre-commitment, cooperative R&D, ratchet eﬀect.
21I n troduction
Technology-forcing regulation is intended to correct market failures involving
externalities by forcing ﬁrms to innovate, the underlying belief being that so-
cially beneﬁcial technologies might remain undeveloped or under-developed
in a free market environment, especially if anticipated development costs
exceed the private beneﬁts of the developer at the margin. In the speciﬁc
context of automobile emissions control in the U.S. which is our focus, the
California Air Resources Board (CARB) in 1990 passed a stringent set of
emissions standards which now cover over 40% of the US automobile market.
But even though the California plan required auto manufacturers to produce
and sell an increasing percentage of zero-emissions vehicles (ZEVs or electric
cars),1 automobile companies have argued strenuously that these emissions
targets are impossible to meet because of technological impediments.2 Over
several years, CARB has had to successively relax its standards.3 Our ob-
jective in this paper on the one hand is to model this market as an explicit
dynamic game between car manufacturers and CARB; on the other, we ex-
1These were 2% in 1998, 5% by 2001, 10% by 2003; the corresponding numbers for
low emission vehicles were 48%, 90% and 95%, while for ultra-low emission vehicles were
2%, 5% and 15%. The low and ultra-low emission categories necessitate substantial im-
provements in catalytic converter eﬃciency, the use of reformulated fuel and the use of
alternative fuels such as methane and compressed natural gas, or hybrid (fuel and electric-
powered) vehicles.
2For instance, many viewed the launch of EV1 in 1996, General Motors’ electric car
with its price tag of $35,000, a maximum speed of 80 mph, a running distance of 70-90
miles, and a recharging process of around 15 hours without a high-speed charger as an
attempt to convince the regulators that the company was genuine in its attempt to meet
the emission standard but that technological impediments made this impossible. See The
Economist, January 13, 1996.
3In 1996, CARB was convinced of the impracticality of the 2% and 5% mandates for
1998 and 2001, which were then relaxed leaving in place only the standard for 2003. It
also relented in its 2003 ZEV standard of 10%, reducing it to 4%, with the remaining
6% being met by near-ZEVs such as extremely clean burning gasoline engines, natural
gas engines, or hybrid gasoline-electric vehicles. At a January 25, 2001 hearing, CARB
approved major changes to the ZEV regulations that will signiﬁcantly reduce the number
of ZEVs required during the near term. See the CARB website at http:\\www.arb.ca.gov
for further details.
3plore the role of noncooperative and cooperative pre-competitive R&D in the
presence of spillovers in meeting CARB’s regulatory objectives.
Our model is based on the classic paper on horizontal R&D of d’Aspr´ emont
and Jacquemin (1988) — henceforth D’A&J — and Yao’s (1988) model of
standard setting under asymmetric information. We consider a duopoly of
automakers and a regulator (CARB) facing a market demand where con-
sumers are assumed to be willing to pay more for cars meeting higher emis-
sions standards.4 Firms know their technological ability to comply with an
emissions standard at a low or high cost (i.e., whether they are ‘low-cost’ or
‘high-cost’ types) but CARB does not. In the ﬁrst period, CARB chooses
an initial emission standard which the ﬁrms are required to comply with.
Automakers respond by choosing R&D investment levels, followed by their
production decisions which provide an imperfect signal to CARB regarding
their types. Based on this signal, CARB resets the environmental standard at
the beginning of the second period and the ﬁrms once again choose research
and production levels. Firms can choose to do research noncooperatively
or cooperatively in the presence of technological spillovers and are Cournot
duopolists in the product market.
We ﬁnd that low-cost ﬁrms will behave strategically and underinvest in
research in the ﬁrst period, both under competitive and cooperative R&D.
The rationale for this is that by underinvesting, ﬁrms are able to preempt
CARB from raising the emissions standard in the second period, leading to
substantial gains in second period proﬁts that more than compensate for
lower ﬁrst-period proﬁts. The level of underinvestment (the ratchet eﬀect)
4The Edmonton Sun in an online article dated May 4, 2001 reports on a Cap Gemini and
Maritz Automotive Research Group study titled ‘Green At What Cost?’. In a follow-up to
a study done in 1999 that showed that 35% of Canadians were willing to pay an average of
$1750 more for “green” vehicles, they found that 42% of the more than 2000 Canadians sur-
veyedw ere willing to pay an average of $1820 more for a vehicle with lower greenhouse gas
emissions in 2001; 82% said they were concerned about the environmental impact of cars,
up from 80% in 1999. See http:\\autonet.ca/edmontondrive/stories.cfm?storyid=2116 for
details.
4is greater under cooperative R&D when spillovers are large. While it is to
be expected that society’s goals may be at odds with private incentives in
this setting — indeed, that is often the justiﬁcation for technology-forcing
regulation in the ﬁrst place — we ﬁnd that when spillovers are high, social
welfare is greater when ﬁrms engage in cooperative R&D but ﬁrm proﬁts are
greater if they do not cooperate in research. Therefore if spillovers are high,
ﬁrms may need additional inducement to engage in cooperative R&D.
Although Yao (1988) has also shown that when product standards are im-
posed by regulation, car makers have the incentive to underinvest in R&D,5
our model diﬀers signiﬁcantly from his in several respects. In Yao’s work,
the industry is modeled as a reduced-form entity whose only decision is how
much to invest in R&D in both periods, and research success (i.e., low-cost
compliance) is probabilistic. We consider a duopoly where each ﬁrm decides
not only how much to invest in R&D in both periods, but also how much
to produce in both periods within a Cournot framework since ﬁrms have to
produce the cars meeting the current emissions standard in each period. Re-
search, be it cooperative or non-cooperative, is deterministic. Furthermore,
while Yao has a constant marginal beneﬁt from the emissions standard, in
our case cleaner cars are of additional value to consumers which changes the
potential gains from trade (and hence the marginal beneﬁt) as the standard
changes. This marginal beneﬁt is also aﬀected by the strategic production de-
cisions of the ﬁrms which determine the market equilibrium price, a channel
of inﬂuence that is missing in Yao.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the basic
model, followed by a derivation of the full-information benchmark in Sec-
tion 3. Section 4 comprises the main results of the paper in analyzing the
no-precommitment asymmetric information case. Section 5 presents a pre-
5Unlike our ratchet eﬀect, in his model it is the high-cost ﬁrm that chooses to under-
invest because initial-period investment increases the expected future costs for high-cost
ﬁrms more than it does for low-cost ﬁrms.
5commitment and self-regulation scenarios. Conclusions and other comments
are in Section 6.
2 The basic model
We model a two-period extensive form game with three players, CARB and
two identical ﬁrms, i and j.I n each period t, the ﬁrms face an inverse
demand pt = a+ηt −(qi
t +q
j




the output produced by each ﬁrm, and ηt is an emissions or environmental
standard chosen by CARB that increases the potential social surplus by
shifting the demand curve outward — consumers value cars meeting higher
emissions standards and are willing to pay more for them. The per-unit cost
of production for ﬁrm i at time t is given by ci




k ∈{ kL,k H} is a cost parameter (0 <k L <k H < 1) which reﬂects the
inherent productive capability of a ﬁrm and inﬂuences how the emissions
standard impacts costs, {xi
t,x
j
t} are the research expenditures of both ﬁrms
which measures their R&D eﬀorts and lowers their unit cost of production,
and σ ∈ [0,1] is an exogenously given research spillover parameter. Note that
for any emission standard level η,aﬁrm with a low k value (henceforth, a
low-cost ﬁrm) indicates a more productive ﬁrm capable of complying with the
environmental standard at a lower per-unit production cost than a high-cost
ﬁrm. Firms are both either low-cost or high-cost.
In each period t, and following Yao and D’A&J, a ﬁrm’s proﬁt is given





2η2, where the second term on the righthand side
reﬂect increasing research costs, and the third term is a ﬁxed cost of attaining
the prevailing emissions standard which increases with the standard. Firm
i (similarly, j) maximizes the discounted sum of two-period proﬁts Πi =
πi
1+δπi
2, where δ is a discount factor that is common to both ﬁrms and CARB.
6Here and later, the corresponding derivation for ﬁrm j can be found by transposing
i’s and j’s.
6Henceforth, we will set δ =1 ;the implications of relaxing this assumption
are discussed in Section 5. Under noncooperative R&D, ﬁrms initially choose
research levels non-cooperatively and subsequently compete ` al aCournot in
the product market. Under cooperative R&D, ﬁrms ﬁrst choose R&D levels
so as to maximize joint industry proﬁts and subsequently choose output levels
noncooperatively.
Except under the full information scenario, we suppose that CARB can-
not observe k but believes that it is either low (kL) with probability θ or high
(kH) with probability (1−θ). The value of θ is unknown but is believed to be
uniformly distributed over the interval [0,1].7 At the end of the ﬁrst period,
CARB may choose to audit the ﬁrst-period cost and update its prior regard-
ing θ before setting the second period emission standard. CARB’s auditing
eﬀort is assumed to be costless.
Using this basic model, we start with a benchmark full information sce-
nario followed by an asymmetric information scenario, each under both non-
cooperative and cooperative R&D. In the asymmetric information scenario
which is the main focus of this paper, CARB sets a standard in the ﬁrst pe-
riod, gathers information on ﬁrst-period costs and updates its prior on both
ﬁrms’ type before setting a second period emission standard. In Section 5,
we brieﬂy discuss a precommitment scenario (when CARB is able to cred-
ibly precommit to an emission standard which prevails for both periods at
the start of the game) as well as a self-regulation scenario (when ﬁrms are
allowed to cooperatively choose an emissions standard that applies to both
periods, before knowing their true type).
7More generally, one may assume that θ follows a beta distribution with parameters
β1and β2. Then the initial probability of kL is β1/(β1 + β2) and that of kH is β2/(β1 + β2).
The uniform distribution case is a beta distribution with β1 = β2 =1 .
73 Emissions standard under full information
3.1 Non-cooperative R&D
If CARB can observe k ∈{ kL,k H},n ou p dating is necessary and all time
period subscripts can be dropped because the solution to the two-period
problem is merely the solution to the one-period problem repeated twice.
Given the chosen emission standard η, research levels {xi,x j}, and taking qj

















where p = a+η−(qi+qj) and c = kη−xi−σxj. The Nash equilibrium out-
put level of ﬁrm i is given by qi =[ a + η(1 − k)+( 2− σ)xi +( 2 σ − 1)xj]/3.
Plugging the values of qi and qj into the proﬁt function above yields a
reduced-form proﬁt function, πi(xi,x j). Then, at the preceding stage, ﬁrm
i chooses an R&D level by maximizing πi(xi,x j) with respect to xi.8 Solv-
ing this maximization problem assuming symmetry, each ﬁrm’s one-period
Nash equilibrium research and production levels under noncooperative R&D
(indexed by the superscript N) are given by:
x
N =




1.5γ[a + η(1 − k)]
D
, (1)
where D =4 .5γ − (2 − σ)(1 + σ); we assume γ>1 which ensures D>0.
Note that the output and research levels are higher if the ﬁrms are low-cost,
i.e., if k = kL.
CARB’s objective is to maximize the one-period social surplus by choos-
ing η appropriately. This second best surplus is simply the sum of consumer
and producer surpluses at the aggregate output level QN, given by the Nash
equilibrium production levels, i.e., QN =2 qN. The one period social surplus

















where the term under the integral is the area under the demand curve and
all the other terms are aggregate costs of production and research.9 Making




2µD2 − (1 − k)2γA
, (3)
where A =1 8 γ − 2(2− σ)
2 > 0 for γ>1.10 Note that ηN decreases with k,
i.e., the emission standard will be higher if both ﬁrms are low-cost (k = kL).





















As in the previous case, ﬁrm i chooses qi non-cooperatively in the second
stage and similarly for ﬁrm j. But now, in the preceeding stage ﬁrms maxi-
mize joint proﬁts πi(xi,x j)+πj(xi,x j) with respect to xi and xj,i n ternalizing
the R&D spillovers. The one-period equilibrium solutions for research and




(1 + σ)[a + η(1 − k)]
D and q
C =
1.5γ[a + η(1 − k)]
D , (5)
where D =4 .5γ − (1 + σ)2 > 0. Note that D>D  for σ>0.5, so for high
spillovers both output and research levels are higher under cooperative than
9Note that in this measure of social surplus, CARB takes the duopolistic market struc-
ture as given, i.e., it corresponds to Suzumura’s (1992) ‘second-best welfare function’.
10The second order suﬃcient condition is that the denominator of ηN be positive, which
is certainly feasible for appropriate parameter values.
9under non-cooperative R&D. Given the aggregate output level QC =2 qC,





2µ(D)2 − (1 − k)2γA (6)
where A =1 8 γ −2(1+σ)2 > 0. Given the emissions standard ηC, each ﬁrm
will maximize its proﬁt level πC(xC,qC,ηC).
3.3 Full information R&D, proﬁt, and social welfare
The following two propositions follow from the derivations in the previous
two subsections:
Proposition 1 Under full information and either noncooperative or coop-
erative R&D, the output and research levels as well as the optimal emission
standard will be higher for low-cost ﬁrms (i.e., k = kL) than for high-cost
ﬁrms.
Proposition 2 Under full information and for any given ﬁrm type (kH or
kL), a high level of research spillover (i.e., σ>0.5) implies a higher output
and research level as well as a higher optimal emission standard under coop-
erative R&D, as compared to non-cooperative R&D. A low level of research
spillover (i.e., σ<0.5) implies higher output and research levels as well as
a higher optimal emission standard only under non-cooperative R&D.11
Proposition 1 is easy to understand: when ﬁrms are low-cost and therefore
more productive, they produce more and undertake more research. It is
also socially optimal to set a higher emission standard in this case since the
marginal social cost of meeting this standard by low-cost ﬁrms is lower.
11The split between high and low spillover rate, deﬁned by the value σ =0 .5, mirrors
D’A&J.
10Regarding Proposition 2, when spillovers are low (i.e., σ<0.5), and
for any given emissions standard η, although an increase in a ﬁrm’s R&D
investement, say ﬁrm i, will lower both ﬁrms unit production costs, it will
lower ﬁrm i’s unit cost suﬃciently more than ﬁrm j’s unit cost so as to
give ﬁrm i a competitive edge over ﬁrm j in the output market, which is
larger than the competitive edge ﬁrm i would obtain if spillovers were high.
Hence, when spillovers are low, R&D investment and output levels are higher
under non-cooperation than under cooperation. CARB will then set a higher
standard η when spillovers are low and ﬁrms do not cooperate in R&D,
because under this scenario ﬁrms tend to invest more in R&D than under
the cooperative scenario. The reverse is true under the cooperative scenario.
Because of the complex interplay between R&D choice, output levels and
the optimal emission standard, analytical results are very diﬃcult to obtain;
therefore, we have resorted to simulations to gain additional insights into this
model. Our benchmark parameter values are γ =5 .5, kL =0 .45, kH =0 .6,
µ =0 .4, and with σ ranging between 0.33 and 0.9.12
Simulation Result 1 Under cooperative R&D, ﬁrm proﬁts are higher when
σ is low (e.g., for 0.33 ≤ σ<0.5) and lower when σ is high (e.g., for
0.5 <σ≤ 0.9)r elative to the non-cooperative R&D scenario, and regardless
of whether both ﬁrms are high or low cost.
To understand this result, note that from Proposition 2, a low σ means a
higher output level (and hence higher gross proﬁts) under noncooperation,
but the higher emission standard imposes a large enough cost that noncoop-
eration proﬁts are smaller than those under cooperation. Thus if σ were low,
ﬁrms would prefer cooperation over noncooperation. For analogous reasons,
ﬁrms would prefer noncooperation over cooperation for a high σ.13
12An Excel simulation ﬁle is available from the authors upon request.
13This is a departure from D’A&J, where ﬁrms earn higher proﬁts under cooperation
than under noncooperation if and only if σ is high.
11Simulation Result 2 Under cooperative R&D, social welfare (and consumer
surplus) is higher when σ is high (for 0.5 <σ≤ 0.9) and lower when σ is
low (for 0.33 ≤ σ<0.5)r elative to the non-cooperative R&D scenario, and
regardless of whether both ﬁrms are high or low cost.
The second simulation result indicates that even though ﬁrm proﬁts are lower
under cooperation when spillovers are high, the higher emission standard in-
creases consumer surplus suﬃciently that welfare levels are higher than under
noncooperation. Hence, even though R&D cooperation is socially desirable
in that it results in higher welfare, ﬁrms do not have an incentive to engage
in it. This fundamental conﬂict between the private incentives of ﬁrms and
what is socially desirable, even under full information, is an interesting and
unique feature of our model with policy consequences: even if spillovers are
high, ﬁrms may need external inducements in order to undertake cooperative
R&D. It should be noted that this result is quite diﬀerent from D’A&J where
social and private incentives coincide.
4 Emissions standard without pre-commitment
4.1 Non-cooperative R&D
In this scenario, there is information asymmetry between the regulator,
CARB, and the regulated ﬁrms. CARB cannot observe k but believes that
it is either low (kL) with probability θ or high (kH) with probability (1−θ).
The value of θ is unknown but is believed by CARB to be uniformly dis-
tributed over the interval [0.1], i.e., at ﬁrst, CARB presumes that kL and
kH are equally likely. But after observing the ﬁrst-period cost, it updates
its prior regarding θ. Under noncooperative R&D, the two-period problem
consists of 6 steps as in Yao (1988):

















































This sequence of moves resembles reality in two critical respects. First, as
discussed in the introduction, the history of emission regulations shows that
although regulations are initially imposed with a speciﬁc deadline, apparently
CARB has not been able to credibly hold the ﬁrms to that deadline, and in
practice the standards have been revised in a dynamic interplay between the
concerned parties. This feature is captured in the two-period extensive form
game outlined above. Second, the actual CARB mandates are phased in
gradually and dynamically over a certain number of years, and our model
reﬂects this in that the ﬁrms have to undertake the production of vehicles
meeting the current environmental standard in each period.
The game is solved backwards for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium assuming
that CARB is aware of the fact that the research and production levels by
the ﬁrms are symmetric in equilibrium.
Steps 5 and 6. The calculation of second period output and research levels
mirrors Section 3.1, where the values of ¯ xN
2 and ¯ qN
2 are given by equation
(1) with k = kH or kL (depending on the ﬁrms’ type), and η = η2. Second
period proﬁts are given by equation (4) with appropriate substitutions.
Step 4. We need to consider whether low-cost ﬁrms might behave manipula-
tively, i.e., whether they will choose lower research levels in the ﬁrst period
so as to appear to be high-cost when CARB audits them at the end of the
ﬁrst period. Does manipulation leads to higher proﬁts overall? In the ﬁrst
period, manipulation entails lowering investment in R&D which saves R&D
13costs, but it raises the unit production costs in order for CARB to be unable
to distinguish them from high-cost ﬁrms. Thus ﬁrst period proﬁts are not
necessarily lower; however, manipulation does reduce the the second period
emissions standard and thereby raises second period proﬁts. While we were
unable to resolve analytically whether overall proﬁts were greater or not, we
could not ﬁnd any parameter conﬁguration where the following simulation
result did not hold:
Simulation Result 3 Manipulation is a dominant strategy for low-cost ﬁrms
for any positive discount factor δ, i.e., low-cost ﬁrms always have an incentive
to manipulate their ﬁrst-period costs.
When low-cost ﬁrms manipulate in the ﬁrst period, CARB learns nothing
regarding the ﬁrms’ true type and its prior unaﬀected. Consequently at the
beginning of the second period in step 4, CARB chooses η2 so as to maximize
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2 =2 ¯ qN
2 and the expectation is taken with respect to the prior on
k. Under the assumption that kL and kH are equally likely, we obtain the
value ¯ ηN




aγ(2 − kH − kL)A
2µD2 − γ [(1 − kH)2 +( 1− kL)2]A
(7)
where A =1 8 γ − 2(2 − σ)2.
Steps 2 and 3. When ﬁrms are high-cost (k = kH), the solution for research










1.5γ[a + η1(1 − kH)]
D
, (8)
14where η1 is the ﬁrst period emission standard set by CARB. The (observed)
ﬁrst-period unit production cost is then ¯ cN
1,H = kHη1 − (1 + σ)¯ xN
1,H; hence,
























When ﬁrms are low-cost (k = kL)o nthe other hand, we assume (consis-
tent with our simulation results) that each ﬁrm behaves manipulatively by
choosing a research level ˜ xN
1,L so that its unit production cost is indistinguish-
able from that of a high-cost ﬁrm, ¯ cN
1,H. Therefore ¯ cN
1,H = kLη1 −(1+σ)˜ xN
1,L,














1,H is given in (8). We assume that the parameter values considered
ensure ˜ xN
1,L is positive.
How does the manipulative ˜ xN
1,L compare to the research level ¯ xN
1,L that
would have prevailed under truthful behavior or non-manipulation? Noting
that ¯ xN
1,L would be given by (8) above with kH replaced by kL,w ed eﬁne
the noncooperative ratchet eﬀect as the diﬀerence
 
¯ xN
1,L −   xN
1,L
 
=[ ( kH −
kL)4.5γη1]/D(1 + σ). The following proposition follows immediately:
Proposition 3 The noncooperative ratchet eﬀect is positive, increasing in
the spread (kH − kL), and decreasing in the spillover rate σ (for ﬁxed η1).
Because low-cost manipulating ﬁrms have the same production cost as
that of high-cost ﬁrms, their output level is also the same, i.e., ˜ qN
1,L =
 




























15The following proposition summarizes what can be concluded regarding re-
search, output and proﬁt levels across low- and high-cost ﬁrms keeping emis-
sion standards ﬁxed in each period.
Proposition 4 In the no pre-commitment scenario with asymmetric infor-
mation and noncooperative R&D,
(1) the ﬁrst-period research level for a low-cost manipulating ﬁrm is smaller
than that of a high-cost ﬁrm (˜ x1,L < ¯ x1,H), while the second-period research
level for low-cost ﬁrms is greater (¯ xN
2,L > ¯ xN
2,H);
(2) the ﬁrst-period output level for a low-cost manipulating ﬁrm is the same
as that of a high-cost ﬁrm (˜ q1,L =¯ q1,H), while the second-period output level
for low-cost ﬁrms is greater (¯ qN
2,L > ¯ qN
2,H); and
(3) the proﬁt of low-cost manipulating ﬁrms is higher than that of high-cost
ﬁrms in both periods.
Finally, we calculate how the ﬁrst-period emission standard is set by
CARB in the following step.
Step 1: The expected ﬁrst-period social surplus, assuming again CARB has












(a + η1 − Z)dZ −
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1,L =2 ˜ qN
1,L =2 ¯ qN
1,H = ¯ QN
1,H from Proposition 4. Maximizing this


















(1 + σ)2 +
2(2 − σ)(kH − kL)(1 − kH)
D(1 + σ)
.
Once the optimal ¯ ηN
1 has been determined, one obtains the following sum-
marizing simulation result (see Tables 1 and 2):
Simulation Result 4 The ﬁrst period equilibrium emissions rate increases
slowly for spillover levels between 0.33-0.6, and declines slowly for spillover
levels greater than 0.6. The equilibrium ratchet eﬀect, however, declines
monotonically with σ, i.e., the higher the spillover, the smaller the noncoop-
erative ratchet eﬀect in equilibrium.
4.2 Cooperative R&D
Under cooperative R&D, the two-period problem consists of the same 6 steps
as in Section 4.1, except at steps (2) and (5) where ﬁrms choose {xit,x jt}2
t=1
cooperatively, i.e., they maximize the sum of their (reduced-form) proﬁts. We
sketch the corresponding derivations in each step.
Steps 5 and 6. The calculation of second period output and research levels
are as in Section 3.2, where the values of ¯ xC
2 and ¯ qC
2 are given by equation
(5) with k = kH or kL (depending on the ﬁrms’ type), and η = η2. Second
period proﬁts are given by equation (4) with appropriate substitutions.
Step 4. As in the noncooperative R&D case, simulations indicate that low-
cost ﬁrms will behave manipulatively in the ﬁrst period. CARB maximizes
the expected second-period social surplus EWC
2 (¯ xC
2 , ¯ QC
2 ,η 2), where ¯ QC
2 =2 ¯ qC
2
and the expectation is taken with respect to the prior on k. The optimal





aγ(2 − kH − kL)A
2µD2 − γ [(1 − kH)2 +( 1− kL)2]A (11)
17where A =1 8 γ − 2(1 + σ)2.
Steps 2 and 3. Firms choose their ﬁrst period research levels cooperatively,
followed by their noncooperative output levels. When ﬁrms are high-cost,
¯ xC
1,H and ¯ qC
1,H are given by (5) with k = kH and η = η1. When ﬁrms are









whereas the output level ˜ qC
1,L ≡ ¯ qC
1,H. Propositions analogous to Propositions
3 and 4 in the noncooperative case are easily derived here as well.
Step 1. CARB chooses an emissions standard η1 so as to maximize the
expected ﬁrst-period social surplus EWC



















(1 + σ)2 +
2(kH − kL)(1 − kH)
D .
4.3 No pre-commitment R&D, proﬁt levels and social
welfare
Comparing the ratchet eﬀects as well as the ﬁrst-period emission standards
under the noncooperative and cooperative regimes, it is straightforward to
derive that the cooperative emissions level is greater than the noncooperative
one if and only if spillovers are large:
Proposition 5 Comparing the two R&D regimes,
(1) the cooperative emissions level ¯ ηC
1 is greater than ¯ ηN
1 and if and only if
σ>0.5;
18(2) the cooperative ratchet eﬀect is also larger than the noncooperative one if
and only if σ>0.5.
Proposition 6 With high spillovers (σ>0.5), the cooperative research lev-
els in each period are higher than the noncooperative ones, i.e., ¯ xC
1,H > ¯ xN
1,H,
¯ xC
2,H > ¯ xN
2,H, ˜ xC
1,L > ˜ xN
1,L, and ¯ xC
2,L > ¯ xN
2,L.
Simulation Result 5 The ﬁrst period equilibrium emissions rate under co-
operative R&D is lower than under noncooperation for low spillover levels,
and higher for high spillover levels. Similarly for the equilibrium ratchet eﬀect
under cooperative R&D as compared to the noncooperative ratchet eﬀect.
The result above is apparent from Tables 1 and 2. From Table 3 follows this
result:14
Simulation Result 6 Forb oth high- and low-cost ﬁrms, the total coopera-
tive research levels increase monotonically with spillover levels, while nonco-
operative research levels decrease monotonically, regardless of whether ﬁrms
are high- or low-cost.
Comparing total welfare and proﬁt levels from the two periods (see Tables
4 and 5) yields the next result, an extension of the full-information Simulation
Result 1 to this scenario with no pre-commitment.
Simulation Result 7 Forb oth high- and low-cost ﬁrms, the total social wel-
fare levels are greater under noncooperative R&D for low spillover levels, and
greater under cooperative R&D for high spillover levels. However, ﬁrm prof-
its are higher under cooperation for low spillovers and under noncooperation
for high spillovers.
14An analogous result also holds in the original D’A&J paper (see p.1134): the non-
cooperative R&D level x∗
i changes with the spillover parameter β and sgn(∂x∗
i/∂β)=
sgn[(2 − β) − 4.5bγ] which is always negative for the demand parameter b normalized to
unity and γ>1. Similarly for the cooperative R&D level ˆ xi, ∂ˆ xi/∂β is always positive.
It should be noted that the monotonicity results in Simulation Result 6 take into account
changes in the optimal emissions standard as the spillover level changes.
19Unlike in D’A&J, our simulation results show that for a high spillover rate,
i.e., for σ>0.5, ﬁrms’ proﬁts are higher under non-cooperative R&D than
under cooperative R&D, but social welfare is lower. The reverse is true for a
low spillover rate, i.e., for σ<0.5. Hence, a conﬂict arises between the ﬁrms
incentive to choose a cooperative R&D regime, and society’s interest.
5 Extensions
In this section, we consider two alternative scenarios, the ﬁrst when CARB
can precommit to an emissions standard for both periods, and the second a
self-regulation scenario when ﬁrms choose the emissions standard coopera-
tively.
5.1 Precommitment
Under the pre-commitment scenario, CARB sets an emission standard level η
at the beginning of period 1, to be complied by both ﬁrms in both periods.15
As in the case of full information, there is no Bayesian updating of beliefs and,
hence, the socially optimal solution to the two period problem is the solution
to the one period problem repeated twice. The symmetric Nash equilibrium
research and output levels under noncooperative R&D in both periods, ˆ xN
and ˆ qN, are given by equations (1) with appropriate substitutions for k and η.
CARB choosesthe emissions standard so as to maximize the expected social
surplus EWN(ˆ xN, ˆ QN,η), where ˆ QN =2 ˆ qN and the expectation is taken with
respect to the prior on k. Under the assumption that kL and kH are equally
likely, the value ˆ ηN for the emisisons standard under non-cooperative R&D is
identical to second period emissions standard without precommitment, i.e.,
15It has been widely debated whether such a commitment by the regulator is credible.
It is reasonable to assume that a regulatory policy implemented under some sort of inter-
national agreement or protocol, is more likely to survive a domestic change of government.
In this case, or in the alternative case of a suﬃciently independent domestic regulator, a
commitment by the latter could become credible.
20ˆ ηN =¯ ηN
2 from equation (7).
With cooperative R&D, the symmetric Nash equilibrium research and
output levels under noncooperative R&D in both periods, ˆ xC and ˆ qC, are
given by equations (5) with appropriate substitutions for k and η. The emis-
sions standard ˆ ηC is identical to the corresponding second period emissions
standard without precommitment, i.e., ˆ ηC =¯ ηC
2 from equation (11).
5.2 Self-regulation
Under self-regulation, ﬁrms set an emission standard cooperatively—in essence
there is no CARB to audit ﬁrms costs and to set technology-forcing stan-
dards, and ﬁrms choose an emission level that maximizes their joint proﬁts.
The emissions standard is assumed to be chosen once, before ﬁrms know their
true type.16
When both ﬁrms do research noncooperatively after they have chosen
the emission standard, the R&D investment ˙ xN and output ˙ qN decisions are
once again given by the equations in (1) with appropriate substitutions. Since
the reduced-form proﬁts of the ﬁrms are identical, maximizing joint proﬁts





2µD2 − γ(1 − k)2H
(14)
where H =9 γ −2(2−σ)2, and k ∈{ kL,k H} depending on whether ﬁrms are
low-cost or high cost.
Similar calculations for the case where ﬁrms choose their research levels





2µ(D)2 − γ(1 − k)2H (15)
16The alternative would be to allow ﬁrms to update at the beginning of the second
period depending on their revealed type.
21where H =9 γ − 2(2 + σ)2.
6 Conclusions
The full-information scenario establishes a few benchmark results. First,
low-cost ﬁrms do more research and produce a larger output than high-cost
ones. At the same time, because a higher emissions standard is valued by
society, CARB sets a higher standard when ﬁrms are low-cost and better
able to meet that standard, resulting in lower proﬁts. There is a fundamental
conﬂict between ﬁrms’ private incentives to conduct cooperative R&D and
society’s interests when consumers value vehicles with lower emissions: for
high spillovers, ﬁrm proﬁts are higher when they do not cooperate, while
social welfare is higher if they do. Since the converse is true for low spillovers,
ﬁrms have the incentive to engage in the opposite type of research to what
is socially optimal.
When considering the asymmetric information scenario where CARB can-
not credibly precommit to a single emission standard, low-cost ﬁrms always
have the incentive to behave strategically and appear to CARB as if they are
high-cost in attempting to keep the second period emission standard lower
than what would otherwise be the case. This is achieved by lowering the
research level undertaken, a ratchet eﬀect that is larger under cooperation
(noncooperation) for high (low) spillovers. As in the full-information case,
social welfare is improved under cooperation for high spillovers, while ﬁrm
proﬁts are higher under noncooperation. This result indicates that the cur-
rent permissive antitrust regulations that allow cooperative research eﬀorts
may not always be welfare improving — indeed, in our model, ﬁrms engage
in cooperative R&D when spillovers are low and noncooperative research is
socially optimal.
The emissions standard is higher under a cooperative research regime if
spillovers are high, but not otherwise. Furthermore, for both low and high
22cost ﬁrms, simulations reveal that the emissions standard increases mono-
tonically with the spillover level under cooperative R&D and the marginal
impact of spillovers is more dramatic. But under noncooperative R&D, the
marginal eﬀect of spillovers is more muted and the level of research under-
taken traces an inverted-U shape; thus high spillovers do not imply higher
research levels in this case. The fact that emission levels decrease for high
spillovers under noncooperation is at the heart of the conﬂict between ﬁrms’
incentives and social welfare.
While we do not report on this extensively, we have considered two alter-
native scenarios, one where CARB can precomit to an emission standard, and
another where ﬁrms choose an emission standard themselves so as to maxi-
mize joint proﬁts. Comparing these four scenarios, simulations show (for the
range of parameter values being considered) that social welfare is clearly (and
unsurprisingly) maximized under full information, while producer surplus is
minimized. Self-regulation on the other hand does the opposite: producer
surplus is maximized while social welfare is minimized. Self-regulation is the
worst scenario for consumers as emission standards are set too low. In be-
tween, we obtain that when ﬁrms are high cost, social welfare is lower under
pre-commitment than under no-commitment even with manipulation. On
the other hand, when ﬁrms are low cost, pre-commitment yields a higher
level of social welfare than no-commitment with manipulation (see Table 6
for details).
Even though our results have been derived for the case of a duopoly, our
results are likely to go through in a more general setting as in Suzumura
(1992), who has extended D’A&J to the case of an oligopoly and general de-
mand conditions. This is important since in the case of the California clean
air mandates, the emission standards apply to the 6 largest car manufactur-
ers. Several extensions to our model may be possible. The hardest is prob-
ably to incorporate non-deterministic R&D. Easier extensions would be to
allow ﬁrms to comply partially rather than fully with CARB’s standards, and
23to introduce audting costs for CARB. Finally, we have only considered the
possibility of both ﬁrms engaging in either cooperative and non-cooperative
R&D simultaneously; in reality ﬁrms will could engage in private research in
addition to cooperative research.
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TABLE 1: Period 1 emission levels under non-cooperative and




























TABLE 3: Two-period research levels for high and low cost firms under














TABLE 4: Social welfare levels for high and low cost firms under non-


















TABLE 5: Profit levels for high and low cost firms under non-
cooperative and cooperative R&DConsumer Surplus Producer Surplus Social Welfare

















































TABLE 6: Ranking of welfare measures for high and low cost firms
under non-cooperative and cooperative R&D